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Article 3

How to Improve Empirical Desert
Adam J. Kolber†
According to empirical desert advocates, lay moral
intuitions are consistent with retributive approaches to
punishment, and policymakers can increase compliance with
criminal justice policies by punishing in accord with those
intuitions.
I offer three challenges to empirical desert intended
ultimately to strengthen its theoretical underpinnings: First,
advocates have cherry-picked certain moral intuitions, while
ignoring others. Second, they have yet to demonstrate the weight
to assign the compliance induced by empirical desert relative to
the weight of other consequentialist considerations. Third,
empirical desert arguably exploits laypeople by using their
“mistaken” beliefs about punishment to encourage their
compliance with consequentialist goals. Such exploitation may
trouble defenders of the “publicity condition,” which requires
that a system of morality be based on principles that can be
announced publicly without thereby undermining those same
principles.
I do not describe precisely how empirical desert
advocates should respond to these concerns, but they will make
substantial headway by more carefully distinguishing the use of
widely-shared moral intuitions to make predictions about
people’s behavior from the use of those intuitions to justify
particular policies. (This article was written for the Brooklyn
Law School Symposium, “Is Morality Universal, and Should
the Law Care?”.)
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INTRODUCTION
Moral and legal theorists often make claims about our
widely-shared intuitions. These intuitions are treated like stars
in the sky. Theorists draw constellations around the stars to
more or less capture their locations and make the connections
between them seem sensible, elegant, and sometimes even
beautiful.
In one such effort, researchers have sought to
systematically gather empirical data about our punishment
intuitions. Paul Robinson, John Darley, and others have argued
that we share certain deep intuitions about punishment that
are surprisingly consistent across people of different ages,
geographies, and cultures.1 Calling the project “empirical
desert,” these researchers argue that our criminal justice
policies and practices should reflect our widely-shared
intuitions. When people see that the law reflects their deep,
intuitive commitments, they are more likely to recognize its
legitimacy and comply with its obligations. Most punishment
theorists have paid little attention to the ways in which
people’s perceptions of the law’s legitimacy can affect their
willingness to comply with it. Empirical desert helps to remedy
this deficiency.
In this symposium article, however, I offer three
challenges to empirical desert intended ultimately to
strengthen its theoretical underpinnings. The first is the
“cherry-picking” challenge. Although empirical desert purports
to examine our intuitions objectively, in fact, advocates focus
only on certain intuitions. In particular, they focus on
intuitions that are elicited at a particular level of abstraction in
ways that hide some of our more passionate intuitions that, for
better or worse, motivate many people. The second is the
“significance” challenge. I note that empirical desert advocates
have yet to show how much compliance empirical desert can
induce. Absent such information, we do not know if there are
good consequentialist grounds for adopting potentially costly
empirical desert policies. The third is the “exploitation”
challenge. Laypeople justify punishment in retributive terms
1

See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications
for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2007) [hereinafter
Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice]; infra Part II.A. Of course, lots of intuitions
do vary by race, gender, and other variables. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Robert
Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829,
1880-83 (2007) [hereinafter Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict].
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while empirical desert advocates justify punishment in
consequentialist terms. One might argue that empirical desert
exploits laypeople by using their “mistaken” retributive
intuitions to encourage their compliance with consequentialist
goals. Such exploitation arguably violates the “publicity
condition,” which requires that a system of morality be based
on principles that can be announced publicly without thereby
undermining those same principles.
In Part I, I discuss, in general terms, the use of moral
intuitions to make predictions about people’s behavior and the
very different use of moral intuitions to justify some policy. In
Part II, I present the three challenges to empirical desert that I
just described. I show how empirical desert generally uses
intuitions in the less controversial predictive mode but
sometimes slips illicitly into the justificatory mode. By being
more attuned to the differences between prediction and
justification, empirical desert can rest on a sturdier foundation.
I.

PREDICTION VS. JUSTIFICATION

Widely-shared moral intuitions might be thought
relevant to the law in two different ways. In the “predictive
mode,” widely-shared moral intuitions help us predict people’s
likely reactions to laws and other policies that implicate those
intuitions. For example, if most voters share the intuition that
it is immoral to use some new military technology, then we
might plausibly predict that voter support for a war will
decline if military leaders begin to use the technology.
Policymakers might decide that, even though the technology
presents a cost-effective method of achieving military
objectives, given public sentiment, the war effort would be
better promoted by refraining from using the new technology
than by using it. In other words, when engaging in cost-benefit
analysis, among the many costs to consider are the costs
associated with taking actions that violate people’s deeply-held
intuitions.
In the predictive mode, our widely-shared moral
intuitions do not justify our actions. Our intuitions merely give
us information that we can use to better achieve societal goals
that we have settled on for other reasons. In the previous
example, opposition to a new military technology tells us
something about how to prosecute a successful military action,
even if it tells us little in any deep sense about the morally
appropriate conditions for using the technology. To the extent
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that legal theorists and policymakers examine widely-shared
moral intuitions in the predictive mode, they may well achieve
their goals. We may disagree about the accuracy of any
particular predictions said to be rooted in findings about our
intuitions, but given the ends of the predictive approach, the
basic methodology is sound.
A second, more controversial way in which intuitions
may be relevant to the law occurs in the “justificatory mode.” In
this mode, we use intuitions not to predict behavior but to
justify moral claims. We cannot easily or automatically
determine that some moral intuition is justified, however,
simply because it is widely held. For example, even if a
majority of voters believe that it is immoral to permit people of
the same sex to marry each other, we might resist the idea that
such intuitions alone, even if they represent a consensus view,
provide any moral support for prohibiting same-sex marriage.
On the other hand, widely-shared intuitions may be
relevant to justification when they fit together with other
intuitions and with deeper moral principles. For example, most
people share the intuition that, absent unusual circumstances,
it is wrong to intentionally kick a sleeping dog. This intuition is
consistent with many other widely-shared intuitions about the
impermissibility of causing unnecessary harm. Perhaps we can
provide some justification for the belief that it is wrong to kick
a sleeping dog by noting that virtually everyone thinks so and
that such intuitions cohere with other intuitions and with
deeper moral principles.
If morality ultimately depends on empirical facts about
the world, as many theorists believe,2 then justifications of
moral claims will likely depend on certain facts about human
psychology and social interaction, including, perhaps, our
widely-shared moral intuitions. If facts about our intuitions
truly are relevant to justification, then the law ought to care
about those intuitions in order to develop morally appropriate
laws. Either way, it is much more difficult to make use of
intuitions in the justificatory mode than in the predictive mode
because there is considerable disagreement about precisely how
2

See, e.g., Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian & David Wong, Naturalizing
Ethics, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY (Walter SinnottArmstrong ed., 2008); cf. John Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence,
and the Future, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 143 (2007) (arguing that we share certain
fundamental moral intuitions that may, like language, have a largely innate
grammatical structure).
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we ought to resolve conflicting intuitions when seeking to
justify interesting moral claims. As I illustrate in the next
section, by keeping the distinction clear between the predictive
mode and the justificatory mode, we can better understand
what it is that empirical desert advocates are trying to do.
II.

CHALLENGES TO EMPIRICAL DESERT

A.

Empirical Desert Overview
1. Two Consistent Findings

Advocates of empirical desert advance two claims in
particular about lay punishment intuitions. First, they argue
that lay punishment intuitions are best explained by the view
that offenders should be punished according to their desert.
According to Paul Robinson and Robert Kurzban, “empirical
studies confirm a nearly universal human intuition that
Desert
serious
wrongdoing
deserves
punishment.”3
considerations purportedly have much more impact on lay
punishment intuitions than considerations about deterring
future crime and incapacitating dangerous people.4 In more
theoretical terms, empirical desert advocates say that lay
intuitions are better explained by retributive rather than
consequentialist punishment principles.5
Second, advocates claim that laypeople have
surprisingly consistent intuitions about the ordinal ranking of
the gravity of crimes.6 Laypeople seek to punish murderers
more than burglars and burglars more than prostitutes. While
laypeople may not agree on the appropriate sentence for
burglary in absolute terms, they will frequently agree on the
relative seriousness of burglary compared to other common

3

Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, supra note 1, at 1848.
See, e.g., Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do
We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 295-97 (2002).
5
Id. at 296-97; see also Kevin M. Carlsmith, On Justifying Punishment: The
Discrepancy Between Words and Actions, 21 SOC. JUST. RES. 119 (2008); Kevin M.
Carlsmith & Avani Mehta Sood, The Fine Line Between Interrogation and Retribution,
45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 191, 195 (2009) (providing some evidence that our
intuitions about the use of harsh interrogation tactics are also largely retributive).
6
See Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, supra note 1, at 185661.
4
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crimes.7 These intuitions also appear to be cross-cultural.8
Robinson and Kurzban think the evidence of cross-cultural
consistency “support[s] the view that people everywhere share
intuitions of justice about the relative blameworthiness of
serious wrongdoing.”9 Even young children have proportional
punishment intuitions.10 Thus, like most retributivist theorists,
laypeople seem to believe both that punishment should be
distributed to those who deserve it and that it should be
distributed in proportion to an offender’s blameworthiness.
2. The Compliance Claim
The preceding results are interesting in their own right
as findings about human psychology. They enter current
debates about sentencing policy, however, by way of an
additional claim prominently made by Paul Robinson and John
Darley. I call it the “compliance claim.” According to Robinson
and Darley, a theory of punishment distribution “that tracks
the community’s perceived principles of justice has a greater
power to gain compliance with society’s rules of lawful
conduct.”11 In other words, they suggest, if people find a legal
regime to be just, then they are more likely to comply with it.12
Moreover, people are more likely to tolerate deviations from
7

See Paul H. Robinson, Empirical Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS
29, 33 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Ferzan eds., 2009)
[hereinafter Robinson, Empirical Desert] (“The level of agreement is strongest for those
core wrongs with which the criminal law primarily concerns itself—physical
aggression, taking property, and deception in exchanges—and becomes less pronounced
as the nature of the offenses moves further from the core of wrongdoing.”).
8
See Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, supra note 1, at 186265.
9
Id. at 1862.
10
Norman J. Finkel, Marsha B. Liss & Virginia R. Moran, Equal or
Proportionate Justice for Accessories? Children’s Pearls of Proportionate Wisdom, 18 J.
APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 229, 241 (1997) (finding that “by grades 2-3,
[children] are making proportionate judgments of culpability and handing out
proportionate punishments to all defendants” in mock scenarios).
11
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 453, 474 (1997) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert]. H.L.A. Hart
made a similar point in H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 36-37 (1963)
(“There are many reasons why we might wish the legal gradation of the seriousness of
crimes, expressed in its scale of punishments, not to conflict with common estimates of
their comparative wickedness. One reason is that such a conflict is undesirable on
simple utilitarian grounds: it might either confuse moral judgments or bring the law
into disrepute, or both.”).
12
See Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 25-28.
Robinson and Darley cite, in particular, the work of Tom Tyler. See TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 57-68, 170-173 (2006).
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their expectations of how the criminal justice system should
work when they believe that the system, as a general matter, is
consistent with their intuitions. According to Robinson and
Darley, “the criminal law can only hope to . . . have people
follow its rules in ambiguous cases if it has earned a reputation
as an institution whose focus is morally condemnable conduct
and is seen as giving reliable statements of what is and is not
truly condemnable.”13
Robinson and Darley defend a set of punishment
practices based on a view they call “empirical desert.”
According to this view, we should arrange our criminal laws
and sentencing policies to reflect the intuitions of laypeople.14
By so doing, we will reduce criminal behavior by encouraging
compliance with laws that are perceived as fair and just. If the
law “develop[s] a reputation as a reliable statement of existing
norms, people will be willing to defer to its moral authority in
cases where there exists some ambiguity as to the
wrongfulness of the contemplated conduct.”15 For these reasons,
Robinson and Darley have argued that investigation into our
moral intuitions should play an important role in the formation
of criminal justice policies.16
Interestingly, the argument in favor of empirical desert
is consequentialist.17 Robinson and Darley defend empirical
desert on the ground that it will promote compliance with the
law, not on the ground that doing so is a deontologically
justified approach to punishment.18 In fact, they acknowledge
13

Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 477; see also Paul H.
Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and
Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 153 (2008) [hereinafter Robinson, Competing
Conceptions] (“Liability and punishment rules that deviate from a community’s shared
intuitions of justice undercut” the law’s reputation “for accurately assessing from the
community’s view what does and does not deserve moral condemnation.”).
14
See Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 13, at 149.
15
Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 474.
16
Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 4.
17
See Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 456.
18
Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 29 (“[P]eople’s shared
intuitions about justice are not justice, in a transcendent sense. People’s shared
intuitions can be wrong.”). In their early writing on empirical desert, Robinson and
Darley may have suggested that community intuitions do bear on deontological
justification. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Community Values to Just
Deserts: Criminal Law, Punishment Rationales, and Democracy, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV.
635, 638 n.14 (2000). Ken Simons notes that community values are at least indirectly
related to deontological justification “[b]ecause our knowledge of moral principles is
fallible” and “modesty counsels in favor of respecting lay opinions.” Id. at 640. Overall,
though, Simons finds that the “relevance of community views to retributive principles
is complex and uncertain.” Id.
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quite straightforwardly that their “arguments for a desertbased system are blatantly utilitarian.”19 Thus, Robinson and
Darley make use of empirical findings about moral intuitions in
the predictive mode. They use widely-shared moral intuitions
to predict and, perhaps someday, manipulate human behavior
in order to achieve what they take to be good consequentialist
outcomes. Assuming that the compliance claim is true and that
we share their goals, Robinson and Darley describe a plausible
way of being a good consequentialist.
Notice that empirical desert advocates do not seem to be
claiming that widely-shared desert intuitions serve in any
direct way to justify our practices. Given their self-professed
commitment to consequentialism, at some level, they
presumably believe that our desert intuitions are mistaken (or
at least that they fail to serve as a sufficient justification for
punishment). Otherwise, it is not clear why they are
consequentialists. If Robinson and Darley can provide any
justification for their use of widely-shared intuitions, they can
do so by claiming that these intuitions enable them to make
predictions about compliance that further their underlying
Their
consequentialist
approach
to
punishment.
consequentialist commitments presumably have some other
justification that is independent of the intuitions they study
empirically.
B.

Three Challenges

According to traditional principles of justification, the
rightness or wrongness of an action is independent of people’s
beliefs about the action’s moral status.20 The mere fact that a
person believes that some action is morally permissible or
impermissible is irrelevant to its moral status unless we have
some further reason to think that the person’s belief is likely to
be correct. So the naked moral intuitions that social scientists
elicit have little normative force unless they fit together in
some framework that justifies those intuitions. Merely
19

Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 456.
Cf. Mary Sigler, The False Promise of Empirical Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS, supra note 7, at 39, 39 (stating that deontological desert is
“[c]onceptually indifferent to people’s intuitions about justice”); Christopher Slobogin,
Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substantive Criminal Law, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315, 324 (1996) (“[E]ven knowledge that the community
resoundingly disfavors a particular legal formulation should usually be irrelevant to
deserts analysis.”).
20
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averaging the intuitions of lots of people will not justify the
intuitions. By way of rough analogy, when deciding what color
to paint an apartment, you might be persuaded by the reasons
suggesting blue or the reasons suggesting red. But it would be
silly to simply average the wavelengths of red and blue and
paint the apartment yellow, as there may be no reasons at all
to support that approach.
Similarly, merely aggregating people’s punishment
intuitions tells us little, if anything, about the deontological
justification for crafting policies consistent with those
intuitions. After all, people’s lay intuitions can be wrong. So
Robinson and Darley must be careful not to suggest that
people’s aggregated intuitions provide (non-consequentialist)
justifications for punishment. Unfortunately, prominent
explications of empirical desert sometimes blur the distinction
between prediction and justification. In the next section, I will
argue that, although empirical desert principally operates in
the predictive mode, it picks-and-chooses from among our
intuitions in ways that seem to slip into the justificatory mode.
1. Cherry-Picking Challenge
Empirical desert advocates frequently claim to capture
laypeople’s “intuitions of justice.”21 Indeed, much of the
rhetorical appeal of empirical desert is that it purports to
capture such intuitions. According to the cherry-picking
challenge, however, it is more accurate to say that empirical
desert seeks to capture only particular aspects of our
punishment intuitions.
Such selectivity would be perfectly appropriate if only
certain intuitions can be used to promote compliance. But
empirical desert advocates have yet to show why the particular
intuitions they examine are the ones most likely to help us
improve compliance. Rather, they often screen out certain
intuitions in ways that seem designed to promote more
deontologically-justified policies. In so doing, they seem to shift
into a justificatory mode that imports non-consequentialist
values and undermines empirical desert’s consequentialist
foundations.

21

See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1. The
expression is also used in the title of Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict,
supra note 1.
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The first way that Robinson and Darley pick-and-choose
pertinent intuitions is by focusing on intuitions elicited at a
certain level of particularity. They explore lay intuitions using
brief hypothetical scenarios that contain a few facts about a
fictitious crime and then ask people to assess a perpetrator’s
level of blame.22 Such intuitions, posed at this intermediate
level of abstraction, do tend to reflect retributive sentiments.
But we could also query people’s intuitions at a more
abstract level. As Kevin Carlsmith has noted, even if people’s
intuitions about appropriate punishment in particular cases
tend to be better explained by retributive notions of
punishment, when asked about the general goals of a
punishment system, laypeople frequently list consequentialist
aims like deterrence and incapacitation.23 We can reasonably
conclude from such findings that people’s intuitions of justice
support consequentialism in some ways and retributivism in
others. People’s intuitions of justice are not univocally
retributive.
Nevertheless, Robinson and Darley focus on the
intuitions laypeople express when engaging in acts of mock
sentencing while mostly ignoring their intuitions when
contemplating the broader goals of sentencing. Though we have
consequentialist intuitions about the broad purposes of
punishment,24 Robinson and Darley would permit few
exceptions to desert-based punishment distributions.25 Thus,
rather than systematically gathering up widely-shared
22

Here is a sample scenario:

John is knocked down from behind by a man with a knife who moves to stab
him. As the man lunges for him, John stabs him with a piece of glass he finds
on the ground, which is the only thing he can do to save himself from being
killed. The man later dies of his injuries.
Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, supra note 1, at 1894. For other
examples, see id. at 1894-1900, 1902-04; PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY,
JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 229-81
(1995).
23
Carlsmith, On Justifying Punishment, supra note 5, at 134-36; Robinson,
Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 35 (noting that subjects “explicitly endorse
deterrence justifications for punishment,” even though “they actually meted out
sentences” in surveys using desert-related criteria); see also Jonathan Baron & Ilana
Ritov, The Role of Probability of Detection in Judgments of Probability, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 553, 582 (2009) (noting that “[p]robes designed to encourage subjects to think
about deterrence” increased, to a small extent, subjects’ willingness to use
consequentialist considerations to mete out punishment).
24
Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 494-97.
25
Id. at 454 (stating that we “ought to assign criminal punishments on
essentially just desert grounds”).
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intuitions and incorporating them into criminal justice policy,
they engage in a further step, deciding whether some
particular widely-shared intuition is too abstract to promote
compliance.
Robinson and Darley would presumably say that
intuitions elicited by mock sentencing are more important for
generating future compliance than are our more abstract
intuitions about the broader goals of sentencing. That certainly
might be true. But it is itself an empirical question. When a
former rapist is released from prison and subsequently
reoffends, people’s incapacitationist views about prison might
lead them to doubt the appropriateness of existing sentencing
policies.
Empirical desert advocates might be accused not only of
ignoring intuitions that are too abstract but also of ignoring
intuitions that are too particularized. For example, Robinson
states that empirical desert “envisions a set of liability and
punishment rules to be applied identically to all defendants; it
is not the community’s view of deserved punishment in a
particular case that is relevant here.”26 So, it seems, we ought
not develop empirical desert policies by examining reactions to
major public events, like the O.J. Simpson trial or the beating
of Rodney King. Robinson justifies this limitation, in part, by
noting that researchers must control the relevant information
that subjects have about a particular case. We cannot
meaningfully compare moral intuitions about some case when
people have different information about its underlying facts.27
But Robinson also poses case scenarios as he does in
order to reduce biased responses. Thus, the second way in
which empirical desert advocates pick-and-choose among our
intuitions is by screening out intuitions that are biased by
factors like racism:
[I]n collecting data to construct the rules, real cases, especially
publicly known cases, typically are not a useful source. People’s
26
27

Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 13, at 149.
Robinson states:

What one makes of the police testimony in the O.J. Simpson case or the
Rodney King case may depend upon how one has come to view police officers
from one’s daily life experiences. If people draw different conclusions from the
testimony, they are likely to have different views of the relevant facts, which
predictably results in different views on the liability and punishment
deserved.
Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 34.
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views on such cases are commonly biased by political or social
context or by other factors such as race, that all would agree have no
proper role in setting principles of justice. Instead, the community’s
intuitions of justice are derived from controlled social science studies
that determine the factors that influence people’s assessment of a
violator’s blameworthiness, not by asking people about abstract
factors but rather by having them “sentence” a variety of carefully
constructed variations of cases to see what factors influence their
punishment judgments.28

If Robinson truly is a consequentialist, however, then he
dismisses the effects of racial bias too quickly. From a
predictive perspective, racially biased intuitions may tell us a
lot about people’s compliance with the law. People who have
such intuitions are likely to question the law’s legitimacy when
it lacks their biases. Surely such intuitions provide relevant
data from a predictive perspective.
Robinson’s decision to ignore racist intuitions seems
only to make sense if he is using intuitions to justify
punishment policies. In that case, we would all agree with
Robinson that racist intuitions “have no proper role in setting
principles of justice.”29 By filtering out biased intuitions on the
ground that they cannot be morally justified, however, he
seems to shift illicitly from the predictive mode to the
justificatory mode.
When we move away from racism to other sorts of
biases, the level of abstraction at which we should elicit
intuitions becomes even more controversial. Robinson states
that “political or social context” can bias our intuitions, but
surely some political or social context can be relevant to
determining what practices are just. More importantly, once we
start to examine the substance of our intuitions to determine
whether or not they should play a role in setting principles of
justice according to what seem to be non-consequentialist
moral criteria, then we should apply those criteria from top-tobottom, analyzing the justifiability of all of our punishmentrelated intuitions. Doing so would make empirical desert quite
a bit more complicated than it currently purports to be.
Robinson could stay safely in the predictive mode by
asserting that intuitions laden with racial, political, or social
biases are not likely to promote compliance. The assertion
might even be true in the long run, though it would require
28
29

Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 13, at 149 (emphasis added).
Id.
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empirical support and further delineation of what is meant by
political and social context. In the short term, at least, laws
designed to eliminate biases are likely to generate noncompliance among those with the biases. So, it is not clear how
Robinson can ignore such intuitions in the predictive mode. If
Robinson screens out racially, politically, and socially biased
intuitions on consequentialist grounds, then he should do so
more explicitly. Otherwise, empirical desert seems to hover in a
gray area that sometimes focuses on intuitions for predictive
reasons and sometimes focuses on them for justificatory
reasons.30
The third way defenders of empirical desert pick-andchoose among our intuitions is by setting the conditions under
which the intuitions are elicited. Robinson and Darley
purposefully sanitize the circumstances under which we gather
empirical desert data in order to discourage answers that
reflect heat-of-the-moment reactions. According to Robinson
and Darley:
Basing the criminal law on community standards does not mean
resolving individual cases as the public or press see them in the heat
of the moment. We know that the public and the press can lose
perspective when buffeted by the biases and prejudices inspired by
the facts of any particular case. The tendency of people to be more
sympathetic to defendants more like themselves is well documented.
Nor does our position support legislators’ hastily passing laws driven
by public reactions to some recent court case that outrages public
opinion.31

Again, Robinson and Darley seem to be slipping into a
justificatory mode. They want us to focus on punishment
intuitions gathered in a calmer state. But if they believe that
we must focus on such intuitions because they are more likely
to be just in some transcendent deontological sense, then they
have indeed slipped into a justificatory mode that seems to
depart from their otherwise purely consequentialist argument
for empirical desert. In that case, it seems once again that we

30

There certainly are a variety of consequentialist grounds for opposing
racism and other forms of bias. So, Robinson could object to creating biased laws on
consequentialist grounds other than just compliance. But as a consequentialist, it
would seem better to first measure people’s biased intuitions. Then, we would know
more about the costs of passing laws that ignore people’s firmly-held biases, even if
unbiased laws have more benefits overall.
31
Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 488 (footnote
omitted).
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may as well delve deeper into the substance of the intuitions at
stake in order to determine if the intuitions are justified.
Alternatively, Robinson and Darley may discount
biased, unreflective intuitions because they believe that a
criminal justice system based on such intuitions will not
maximally promote long-run compliance. Such a view would
remain safely in the predictive mode. Unfortunately, it’s not
clear that it’s true. Real world cases will generate precisely the
sorts of outrage, bias, and prejudice that Robinson and Darley
seek to exclude when they elicit our intuitions at the
experimental stage. Indeed, researchers have found that
subjects give more punitive responses to questions about
punishment when they are angered than when they are calm.32
When people decide whether or not to violate the law, they are
frequently in states of anger; so from a predictive perspective,
we might generate better information about compliance
behavior by querying angry subjects. Nevertheless, Robinson
and Darley choose to query subjects in calm states, presumably
because calmer intuitions are somehow more justifiable than
angrier intuitions.
The choice of survey conditions can substantially affect
survey responses. When primed with disgusting odors or video
clips, subjects find hypothetical bad acts, like lying on a
resume, more morally wrong.33 By contrast, subjects primed
with words associated with purity and cleanliness give less
severe ratings of wrongfulness.34 The effect of disgusting stimuli
on wrongfulness ratings can be reduced, however, if subjects
are made to wash their hands after exposure to disgusting
stimuli.35 When empirical desert researchers elicit intuitions,
they need to decide whether to do so with subjects that are
angry, calm, disgusted, or comfortable, with hands that have
recently been washed or not. Those choices must be justified,
32

See Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg & Philip E. Tetlock, Sober
Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on
Attributions of Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 568 (1998).
33
See generally Simone Schnall et al., Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment,
34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1096 (2008). For other examples of how our
moral intuitions vary based on context, see Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & David
Hoffman, Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev.
(forthcoming, 2010) (manuscript at 17-55, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443552).
34
Simone Schnall, Jennifer Benton & Sophie Harvey, With a Clean
Conscience: Cleanliness Reduces the Severity of Moral Judgments, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI.
1219, 1219-20 (2008).
35
Id. at 1220-22.
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presumably on the grounds that some survey conditions will
provide better information about how to increase compliance.
I am not criticizing any of the particular choices made
by empirical desert advocates when querying lay intuitions.
Rather, I am highlighting the many ways in which the
selection of survey questions and conditions will affect survey
results. In order to stay true to their consequentialist
underpinnings, empirical desert advocates should do more to
bolster the consequentialist grounds for their choices of survey
questions and conditions.36
Finally, empirical desert advocates make implicit
decisions about whose intuitions to examine. If we were seeking
to identify punishment intuitions generally, we could query a
random sample of the population. But Robinson and Darley
seek to gather information to boost compliance. A random
sample of the population will contain relatively few people who
are on the fence between offending and not offending, at least
with respect to offenses of any seriousness. Making the law
consistent with the intuitions of a random sample of surveytakers in the population is unlikely to generate much
compliance because most people in the sample would be
unlikely to violate serious criminal laws in the first place.37
If Robinson and Darley were truly interested in
reducing crime, they should focus their inquiries on those who
are most likely to be on the fence with respect to compliance.
Many of those who actually commit crimes are mentally ill or
addicted to drugs, so perhaps Robinson and Darley should
focus on these populations. I suspect they do not, however,
because though they purport to gather intuitions for predictive
36

Even if people have widely-shared intuitions of ordinal punishment
severity under a variety of conditions of elicitation, empirical desert purports to
address a much wider range of intuitions. As to these other intuitions, they will often
depend on the conditions of elicitation.
37
Robinson and colleagues are also concerned with more modest forms of
subversion, as when jurors ignore a judge’s instructions or when police officers do not
follow proper procedures. See Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael Reisig,
The Disutility of Injustice 42 (Sept. 13, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1470905) [hereinafter Robinson et
al., Disutility of Injustice]. If this is the sort of subversion that empirical desert
advocates hope to reduce, it is hardly clear that the goal can justify revolutionizing our
punishment practices. It’s one thing if empirical desert reduces crimes like murder,
rape, and burglary but quite another if it merely increases compliance with police
procedures and jury instructions. Furthermore, while we generally seek to encourage
compliance with such behavioral norms, it is hardly clear that society functions better
whenever subversion is reduced. Most consequentialists, I suspect, would seek to
optimize rather than minimize rates of subversion.
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purposes, in fact, they limit the scope of intuitions gathered to
those that are elicited from only certain people under certain
conditions that are likely to seem morally justified.
To be clear, I am not arguing that empirical desert
advocates should query angry, biased, or drug-addicted
subjects. Rather, I claim that advocates must defend their
choices. If they defend them in the predictive mode, then they
should present empirical data showing that laws that square
with calmer, unbiased intuitions generate more compliance
than laws that square with intuitions elicited under other
circumstances.38 Alternatively, if advocates defend their
selection of intuitions in the justificatory mode (which seems
doubtful), then they should explain why we filter out only some
intuitions that are unjustified but stop short of examining the
justification of lay intuitions from top to bottom, including the
lay intuition that people should be punished to obtain
retribution.
Empirical desert advocates clearly recognize the
distinction between using intuitions to predict and to justify.39
Robinson explicitly states that “[e]mpirical desert can only tell
us what people think is just. It cannot tell us what actually is
just. In other words, it cannot tell us what an actor
‘deontologically deserves.’”40 The challenge, though, in
responding to the cherry-picking challenge is to make clear
that interests in justifying punishment do not accidentally
sneak in to the methodology.
2. Significance Challenge
Empirical
desert
advocates
are
self-avowed
41
consequentialists. As consequentialists, they believe that
punishment is justified by its instrumental ability to achieve
good ends like crime prevention and prisoner rehabilitation.
They care not just about achieving these goals but also about
38

Of course, if we had good data on how particular laws affect compliance, we
might observe regularities in the data without needing surveys of lay intuitions at all.
In a world with better data on the relationship between laws and compliance, empirical
desert would likely prove most helpful as a method of generating hypotheses as to
which new laws to test first.
39
Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 37.
40
Id.
41
See Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 456 (stating
that their “arguments for a desert-based system are blatantly utilitarian.”); id. (“We
give . . . a utilitarian justification for the only non-utilitarian system for allocating
punishment.”).
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doing so in a cost-effective manner.42 So, ultimately, empirical
desert advocates will have to present evidence, not just that
they can increase compliance, but that they can do so in a
manner that best promotes all consequentialist goals. The
significance challenge says that unless we can estimate how
much compliance we will generate by adopting a policy
consistent with empirical desert, we won’t know if the policy
warrants deviating from our ordinary consequentialist policies.
One problem is that, unless we know how much
compliance some empirical desert policy will generate, we
cannot choose among various competitor policies. To take one
important example discussed earlier, Robinson and Darley
make much of the fact that people have remarkably consistent
intuitions about the comparative blameworthiness of offenses,
at least among core crimes “of physical aggression,
unconsented-to takings, and deception or deceit in exchanges.”43
Thus, they note, for a wide range of crimes, we have
surprisingly consistent intuitions about their appropriate
ordinal punishment severity (the ranking of punishment
magnitudes for different crimes).44
When it comes to crafting actual policy, however, the
significance of this finding may be swamped by another set of
punishment intuitions about which laypeople have wideranging intuitions. Namely, surveys show that people have
quite varied intuitions about the absolute amount of
punishment that offenders should receive for committing a
particular offense.45 Given the inconsistency in our intuitions of
cardinal punishment severity, it is not surprising that
jurisdictions vary considerably in the length of prison
sentences they assign to various crimes. Robinson and Kurzban
note that “American offenders were required to serve an
42

See ANTONY DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 156-57 (1986) (describing
essential features of consequentialist punishment).
43
Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, supra note 1, at 1880;
Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 57.
44
Empirical desert advocates may overstate the salience of this finding. See
Braman, Kahan & Hoffman, supra note 33, at 17-20 (arguing that people have
divergent punishment intuitions about “victimless” or “vice” crimes and that “the
incidence of these crimes greatly outnumbers the incidence of criminal victimizations”).
45
See Robinson et al., Disutility of Justice, supra note 37, at 16 (“While
people tend to agree on the proper rank order of cases on the punishment continuum,
at least for the kind of core harms at issue here, some people tend to be harsh in their
‘sentencing,’ while others are lenient.”); Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and
Conflict, supra note 1, at 1880-82; Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note
1, at 9.
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average of twenty-nine months after conviction in 1999,” while
“the average offender in the Netherlands was released after
five months.”46 Meanwhile, the average Columbian offender was
“not released until a startling 140 months”47 after conviction.
Even if we can increase compliance to some extent by
making ordinal punishment severity line up with widelyshared intuitions, the compliance bonus we generate might be
small relative to the loss of compliance generated when the
cardinal severity of our punishments is out of line with people’s
intuitions. Indeed, it seems unlikely that a person will care
very much if the penalty for grand theft is a little higher or
lower than the penalty for a minor battery if penalties for all
offenses are an order of magnitude higher or lower than where
he thinks they should be.48 Moreover, people are more likely to
learn about the absolute magnitude of a punishment in the
media than they are to learn about a punishment’s severity
relative to the punishment for other crimes.49
Robinson argues that our punishments should line up
with widely-shared ordinal punishment intuitions. An
alternative strategy, however, is to make our punishments line
up, to the extent possible, with everyone’s not-widely-shared
absolute punishment intuitions. Whichever strategy is better
can only be determined by having some sense of how deviations
from ordinal punishment intuitions affect compliance relative
to deviations from cardinal punishment intuitions, something
we cannot assess well from social science surveys of people’s
intuitions. Similarly, empirical desert policies that require us
to spend additional resources are only warranted if they
promote compliance better than alternative policies, like

46

Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, supra note 1, at 1882.
Id.
48
See Sigler, supra note 7, at 40 (recognizing that we care about absolute
proportionality at least as much, if not more so, than relative proportionality).
49
See Robinson et al., Disutility of Injustice, supra note 37, at 50 n.158
(“[M]edia tend[] to focus on the absolute amount of punishment imposed rather than
upon the relative amount of punishment among different cases.”); see also id. at 32 (“It
is often the case that voters are only informed about the duration of sentences assigned
in specific cases . . . .”); id. at 32-33 (“[M]ost of the crime stories in newspapers are
relatively brief and commonly report the sentence given, but generally omit or gloss
over the reasoning that lies behind the assigned sentences.”); id. at 33 (“It appears
likely that media accounts of crimes are the source that voters generally use to form
their judgments on courtroom sentencing.”). More generally, empirical desert is likely
to have little impact on compliance if laypeople are not even exposed to information
about how the law deviates from their intuitions. See Slobogin, supra note 20, at 326.
47
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training or hiring police officers to promote better partnerships
with communities.50
A second problem is that even if we could decide which
empirical desert strategy would best promote compliance, we
would have no grounds for implementing it, unless it fits well
in a consequentialist calculus.51 Suppose, for example, that we
can make our punishments more consistent with empirical
desert by raising the typical sentence for some offense by one
year. Unless we can estimate the amount of compliance we are
likely to gain, we won’t know if the compliance benefit
outweighs the cost of incarcerating offenders for the additional
year. Similarly, if we can make our punishments more
consistent with empirical desert by reducing the typical
sentence for some offense by one year, we won’t know if the
compliance benefit outweighs the loss of incapacitation and
rehabilitation we would have had if we maintained the status
quo policy. These sorts of determinations are difficult to make
absent data about induced compliance.
Robinson recognizes that empirical desert cannot tell
the whole story about appropriate punishment. He notes, for
example, that a deviation from empirical desert “might so
clearly provide a crime-control bonanza that any crimogenic
effect from undermining the system’s moral credibility would
be outweighed by the deviation’s crime-control benefits.”52 But
he treats such occasions as highly exceptional, claiming that we
“ought to assign criminal punishments on essentially just
desert grounds.”53 In other words, Robinson defends the
unconstrained adoption of empirical desert so long as we are
open-minded about occasional deviations. But if empirical
desert adds just a modest compliance bonus, we are not
justified in adopting it wholesale, unless we understand its
effects relative to other consequentialist goals.
Robinson recognizes that “our current knowledge
regarding [the crime-control benefits of empirical desert] is
50

See Slobogin, supra note 20, at 326 (noting that compliance may depend on
respect for those with legal authority, as well as the laws they enforce).
51
See Simons, supra note 18, at 641 (stating that it is unclear if the benefits
of empirical desert “are sufficiently large to outweigh the utilitarian costs of securing
correspondence between community values about just deserts and the content of the
criminal law”); see also id. at 661.
52
Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 38.
53
Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 454; see also id. at
498 (“We conclude that desert distribution of liability happens to be the distribution
that has the greatest utility, in the sense of avoiding crime. Thus, utility theorists
ought to support liabilities assigned according to such a desert-based system.”).
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limited and that more research would be extremely valuable.”54
Nevertheless, he does “not believe that we need wait for [the
research] before preferring empirical desert” to its
competitors.55 According to Robinson, empirical desert “can be
readily operationalized—its rules and principles can be
authoritatively determined through social science research into
peoples’ shared intuitions of justice.”56
On the contrary, however, we cannot use social science
surveys alone to determine how much compliance empirical
desert will generate. To do that, we would have to engage in
the very difficult process of monitoring and analyzing the
effects that empirical desert policies have on compliance
behavior. We can use surveys to test short-term effects of
people’s beliefs about the law on their reported willingness to
comply with the law. But such studies will still be a far cry
from delivering the sort of real-world data we would need in
order to estimate compliance induced by real-world empirical
desert policies. Therefore, we cannot operationalize empirical
desert as part of a consequentialist punishment system until
we can better estimate how much compliance empirical desert
policies induce.57
54

Paul H. Robinson, Reply, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 7,
at 61, 63 [hereinafter Robinson, Reply].
55
Id. But cf. Michael T. Cahill, A Fertile Desert?, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS, supra note 7, at 43, 43-44 (raising questions about the ability of
empirical desert to generate compliance).
56
Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 29.
57
As this article neared publication, Robinson and colleagues released a draft
paper that provides some evidence about how exposure to policies that deviate from lay
intuitions may affect behavior. See Robinson et al., Disutility of Injustice, supra note
37. They studied subjects who were asked to envision themselves living in a
hypothetical jurisdiction that handed down several sentences that sharply diverge from
lay intuitions. The sentencing decisions said to be from the hypothetical jurisdiction
were, in fact, aggregated from real U.S. jurisdictions, and subjects were so informed.
Id. at 45, 48. The researchers found that exposure to the sentencing information led
subjects to report a higher likelihood of disobeying certain behavioral norms (not
necessarily criminal law violations) in the hypothetical jurisdiction. Id. at 50.
While the research is a step in the right direction, it does not come close to
providing sufficient reason to implement empirical desert and certainly does not enable
us to operationalize it. I will briefly mention just three reasons why. First, the research
focuses principally on subversive rather than criminal behavior, and it is far from clear
that subversive behavior should be minimized rather than optimized. Second, we do
not know how closely survey responses reflect actual behaviors. We are understandably
skeptical that short-term exposure to genuine information about sentencing will have
much of a long-term effect on compliance. After all, if such short-term exposure really
increased people’s likelihood of violating behavioral norms, we might be troubled by the
conduct of the research itself or at least require greater precautions to undo its
deleterious effects (given that the research acknowledged using actual U.S. cases).
Third, in the real world, many people have even less exposure to sentencing
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Robinson argues that empirical desert can be
operationalized at least as easily as its competitors.58 But
empirical desert is a form of consequentialism. So empirical
desert cannot be operationalized if consequentialism cannot.
Even if increasing some penalty will generate compliance by
making the penalty better align with widely-shared intuitions,
we cannot say that the higher penalty is cost effective unless
we have some sense of how much compliance the increased
penalty will generate. There may be narrow circumstances
where empirical desert can be helpful even with limited
information, but wholesale adoption of empirical desert
principles requires much more data on induced compliance.
The bottom line is that if empirical desert truly is a
form of consequentialism, then it has to address a variety of
consequentialist punishment goals. To do that, it must yield
predictions about the magnitude of compliance some policy can
be expected to induce, so we can compare that effect to other
expected consequences of the policy. The significance challenge
emphasizes that until empirical desert advocates can better
quantify the effects on compliance of conforming to or deviating
from widely-shared intuitions, we will know little about how
much impact widely-shared intuitions should have on our
consequentialist punishment policies and whether empirical
desert should be a guiding light or just an important, though
somewhat nebulous, factor to consider.
3. Exploitation Challenge
Even though empirical desert seems best understood as
a consequentialist approach to punishment, Robinson has tried
to make empirical desert appeal to retributivists, too.
According to Robinson, retributivists may find that “empirical
desert will produce far more deontological desert than any
other workable principle that could or would be adopted.”59 Yet,
information than did the study subjects and are unlikely to be exposed to so many
cases with outcomes that diverge so substantially from lay intuitions. Deviations from
lay intuitions cannot reduce compliance unless people are consciously or unconsciously
exposed to information that reveals the deviations.
58
Robinson, Reply, supra note 54, at 63.
59
Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 29. Elsewhere, Robinson has
made the pitch more modestly: “The best that can be said about it deontologically is
that [empirical desert] may produce something less in conflict with deontological desert
than would the more traditional instrumentalist distributive principles, such as
general deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, or rehabilitation.” Robinson,
Reply, supra note 54, at 61.
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I suspect that many retributivists would take issue with this
claim. They may say that if you purposely or knowingly punish
in excess of true deontological desert, you are not producing a
lot of retributive justice; you are producing no justice at all.
Moreover, if appropriate punishment requires us to punish
people for deontological reasons, then an empirical desert
punisher, motivated by consequentialist principles, may be
imposing no deontological desert whatsoever.
But even if retributivists are sympathetic to Robinson’s
claim about the amount of deontological desert created by
empirical desert, I raise here a different challenge. Namely,
retributivists may be concerned that empirical desert seeks to
gain compliance from the general public by exploiting
laypeople’s
desert
intuitions
in
order
to
achieve
consequentialist ends. According to this exploitation concern,
empirical desert advocates are accommodating the preferences
of laypeople, not because they believe that laypeople are likely
to know what punishments are just but rather because
empirical desert advocates can take advantage of laypeople’s
beliefs in order to distribute punishment according to what
empirical desert advocates take to be the real
(consequentialist) principles of punishment.
The exploitation concern arises from the fact that
empirical desert only induces compliance when laypeople make
a certain questionable inference. According to Robinson and
Darley, “citizens in general regard the law as a credible guide
to how they ought to behave.”60 In borderline cases, “community
members are more likely to give deference to the commands of
the criminal justice system if the system is morally
authoritative.”61 But does empirical desert lead to more morally
authoritative laws in the eyes of laypeople? If Robinson and
Darley are right that people understand what is “morally
authoritative” in retributive terms, the answer is no. As
Robinson states, empirical desert “cannot tell us what an actor
‘deontologically deserves.’”62 So, whether laypeople are
conscious of it or not, the compliance induced by empirical
desert happens through an irrational or non-rational process.
There is no good reason why empirical desert should induce

60
61
62

Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 30.
Id. at 29.
Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 37.
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compliance among laypeople if they are true retributivists.63
Retributivists should not be swayed by aggregate data about
other people’s intuitions unless they have reasons to trust
other people’s views about justice more than their own. By
crafting policies with the aura of deontological legitimacy in
order to take advantage of an irrational or non-rational
cognitive process, empirical desert is arguably exploitative.
If you have consequentialist leanings, you are not likely
to be troubled by the exploitation concern. There are two
reasons, however, why such exploitation raises problems for
empirical desert. The first is that exploitation may itself offend
principles of legitimate government. Some theorists, especially
the deontologically-minded retributivists to whom Robinson
appeals, may find it inappropriate for the government to obtain
undeniably good results if it must do so through misleading
processes.
To illustrate, suppose that public health bureaucrats
determine that we can ease people’s back pain by providing
free “medical” bracelets. The bracelets have no special
properties but have been found to ease chronic suffering
through a placebo effect. May we distribute the bracelets along
with misleading information that the “medical” bracelets heal
back pain? On the one hand, the bracelets really do relieve pain
quite inexpensively and that’s a great public good. On the other
hand, the bracelets achieve the beneficial effect by creating the
impression that they have pharmacologically-active properties.
If we told people that the bracelets were quite ordinary, they
would not work as well.

63

In this section, I take at face value Robinson and Darley’s claim that
laypeople have retributive punishment intuitions. To the extent that they, in fact, have
consequentialist punishment intuitions or only have limited retributive intuitions, then
they may have quite rational motivations for endorsing empirical desert. For example,
it is quite possible that laypeople have clear retributive views about particular
instances of punishment but not about how we should justify punishment more
generally. If so, policies consistent with empirical desert would not run counter to
laypeople’s underlying beliefs about justification, and the exploitation concern would be
weak or non-existent.
While it is not clear if laypeople care about the underlying justification of
our punishment policies, Robinson at least suggests that laypeople care about more
than just the magnitude of sentences we impose. See Robinson et al., Disutility of
Justice, supra note 37, at 50-51 (“[W]hat we know about making and keeping
reputations tells us that the [criminal justice] system’s intention regarding doing
justice counts enormously. While accidental or unavoidable injustices or failures of
justice may be forgiven, if the system seems committed to trying to do justice, when
revealed deviations from desert are intended by the system . . . then even a single
telling case can have detrimental consequences.”).
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Empirical desert may function like the placebo
bracelets. If empirical desert works, it achieves an indisputable
public good—the reduction of crime. But it achieves the public
good by creating the impression that the criminal law has the
sort of deontological legitimacy that laypeople purportedly
desire. So, one might argue, empirical desert exploits people’s
perceptions of the law’s legitimacy to accomplish a goal that is
inconsistent in certain ways with their underlying intuitions of
justice.64
Perhaps
such
exploitation
is
justified
on
consequentialist grounds. Maybe we are permitted to be less
than forthcoming in order to obtain good effects. But to the
extent that empirical desert advocates seek to appeal to
deontologically-minded retributivists, they have to explain
what justifies such exploitation according to deontological, not
consequentialist, principles.
A second reason why the exploitation concern may be
problematic is that it has the potential to undermine empirical
desert itself. If empirical desert induces compliance through an
irrational or non-rational process, the connection may not
stand up to public scrutiny. For example, Robinson and Darley
state that “[w]ithout knowing quite why insider trading is
morally wrong, most of us accept the conclusion that it is
wrong, because the relevant authorities have thought about it,
and assert it is wrong.”65 But if laypeople are retributivelyminded as Robinson and Darley say they are, laypeople
presumably believe that the relevant authorities punish insider
trading because it deserves punishment and not because
punishing insider trading has good consequences. Yet if
Robinson and Darley have their way, the relevant authorities
would ultimately punish insider trading because doing so has
good consequences. Such an approach, one suspects, may not
sit well with retributively-minded laypeople.
A layperson may complain, “I thought you punished my
loved one for insider trading because there was something
morally wrong with his behavior. Now, however, I see what
really happened: you found some sociological surveys showing
64

As Ken Simons has argued, it follows from the views of Robinson and
Darley that the “[g]overnment should, in principle, expend resources to deceive people
into believing that the system is just (e.g. by suppressing information about injustices)
if this would be cheaper than expending resources to improve the actual justice of the
system.” Simons, supra note 18, at 660.
65
Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 30.
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that you can boost compliance with other laws by punishing
him in accord with people’s uninformed, automatic intuitions.”
In other words, the very methodology of empirical desert may
be inconsistent with the way that laypeople believe that
punishment should be distributed. Empirical desert may be
partially self-defeating.
We could ask laypeople if it is better to establish a
punishment scheme according to empirical desert principles or
according to traditional retributivist principles. To my
knowledge, no one has investigated this particular question.
But given that laypeople are said to have desert-oriented
intuitions, perhaps they have the intuition that a punishment
scheme founded on empirical desert is not generally just.
To more convincingly show that empirical desert truly
captures intuitions of justice, empirical desert advocates could
test intuitions related to empirical desert itself.66 If laypeople
have intuitions that are consistent with empirical desert, then
we would have little to worry about. But suppose instead that
laypeople believe that offenders should receive the punishment
they deserve based on a more timeless conception of desert that
squares with considered, reflective judgment. If so, we might
expect laypeople to find unattractive a criminal justice system
that is overtly based on empirical desert. After all, it’s one
thing to think that an offender received a particular term of
incarceration because such was the conclusion of a team of
criminal justice experts. It’s quite another to think that the
term of incarceration was determined by averaging the widelyshared intuitions of people with no specialized knowledge or
experience with the criminal justice system.67
66

Robinson denies that we have intuitions about such matters. Robinson
states, “Kolber imagines that lay persons have intuitions about all sorts of things other
than deserved punishment, such as the societal goals of punishment.” Robinson, Reply,
supra note 54, at 62 (emphasis added). Contra Robinson, there is no question that we
have intuitions about all sorts of issues, including societal goals of punishment.
Robinson may be right that our views about broad societal goals are overlayed with
“reasoned judgments,” in ways that make them different than the sorts of intuitions
that are his central focus. See Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at
4-8. But good consequentialists must still be interested in intuitions that are overlayed
with reasoned judgments. After all, when a person decides whether or not to break the
law, his behavior depends not only on his steadfast, automatic intuitions but also on
his strongly-held, even if more flexible, reasoned judgments.
67
Alice Ristroph challenges empirical desert from a different direction. She
writes that it “seems doubtful that sentencing policies based on the laboratory findings
of social scientists will be perceived as more legitimate than policies chosen by the
ordinary democratic process.” Alice Ristroph, The New Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS, supra note 7, at 45, 49. Of course, the policies of empirical desert still
require approval through the democratic process, so Ristroph is presumably suggesting
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If laypeople would report finding the empirical desert
approach to punishment less attractive than other methods of
distributing punishment, then empirical desert counsels us to
conform the criminal justice system to laypeople’s intuitions. If
those lay intuitions are contrary to empirical desert, then
empirical desert counsels us not to use a system of empirical
desert!
Robinson rejects this possibility, claiming that laypeople
do not care about the difference between empirical desert’s
consequentialist aims and their own deontological aims.
According to Robinson:
[F]rom the layperson’s point of view, empirical desert is
deontological desert, both in its distribution and its motivation.
[Laypeople] will see no difference between the two. An empirical
desert distribution of punishment to them is exactly what true
justice requires. Even if you showed people the empirical studies,
their reaction is likely to be a so-what shrug. It’s all very nice that
these psychology studies show that criminal law is doing justice as
the community sees it, they might say, but what matters to me is
that the system really is doing justice.68

Yet, empirical desert is most assuredly not really doing
justice as the community sees it if the community understands
justice deontologically. True, laypeople may never come to
recognize the differences. But if what matters to laypeople is,
as Robinson says, that “the system really is doing justice,” then
laypeople may be misled by empirical desert because, as
discussed, the “desert” aspect of empirical desert is essentially
a facade. Deontological desert plays no direct justificatory role
in empirical desert, just as it plays no direct role in traditional
descriptions of consequentialism.69
Rather than denying that there is any meaningful
difference between the lay conception of justice and the
empirical desert approach, empirical desert advocates could
just stick to their consequentialist guns. They could simply
recognize that there is a difference between the lay conception
of justice and empirical desert but argue that this particular
that a straightforward empirical desert methodology is, in some sense, outside the
ordinary democratic process.
68
Robinson, Reply, supra note 54, at 62.
69
There are non-traditional versions of consequentialism, however, that do
give a more fundamental role to deontological desert, as discussed in MICHAEL MOORE,
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 155-59 (1997) and in Michael
T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 833-36
(2007).
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violation of lay intuitions is unlikely to have much effect on
compliance. Even if laypeople reject empirical desert as an
overarching theory of punishment distribution, this particular
aspect of lay intuitions can, perhaps, be safely ignored. To this
extent, a “so-what shrug”70 from consequentialists may be
appropriate.
But even if the effect on compliance is small, defenders
of empirical desert may still have reasons to hide empirical
desert from laypeople. Once one accepts the compliance claim—
the central tenet of empirical desert that people are more likely
to comply with a criminal justice system that matches their
intuitions—then, arguably, we can control crime even more
efficiently if people believe that our system of punishment is
based on traditional deontological principles rather than the
consequentialist principles that Robinson and Darley actually
use to support empirical desert.
Whatever one thinks about traditional notions of desert,
we may very well encourage more respect and compliance in a
community that erroneously believes we use traditional desert
principles than in a community that believes we use
consequentialist principles of empirical desert. Admittedly, this
is an empirical question. However, it closely matches the
empirical claim that underlies empirical desert, namely, that
people comply more with a punishment system that comports
with their moral intuitions.
To some influential theorists, like Immanuel Kant and
John Rawls, no acceptable moral theory can advocate its own
secrecy.71 Such theorists defend a “publicity condition,” which
requires that a system of morality be based on principles that
can be announced publicly without thereby undermining those
same principles.72 Lots of consequentialist theories scrape up
against the publicity condition,73 but the issue is particularly
acute for Robinson and Darley because they seem to have
already endorsed a version of the publicity condition. They
state that hiding government operations that are perceived as
unjust “would be hard to do without breaching notions of press
70

Robinson, Reply, supra note 54, at 62.
See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY 185
(M. Campbell Smith trans., 1795); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 130, 133 (1971).
But see HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 489-90 (7th ed., Hackett 1966)
(1893).
72
See generally David Luban, The Publicity Principle, in THE THEORY OF
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 154 (Robert E. Goodin ed. 1996).
73
Id. at 166-68.
71
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freedom and government transparency to which liberal
democracies aspire.”74 Thus, the publicity condition may create
more trouble for Robinson and Darley than for most
consequentialists because they seem to endorse nonconsequentialist limitations on methods of obtaining
compliance.
I do not believe that concerns about the publicity
condition are devastating for empirical desert theorists. At
least certain forms of beneficent deception should be
permissible.75 Still, empirical desert could strengthen its
foundations by empirically testing whether laypeople find
empirical desert itself to be an appealing approach to
punishment likely to garner their respect and compliance and,
if not, explaining whether empirical desert endorses a publicity
condition or is willing to mislead laypeople in order to better
promote consequentialist goals. Robinson and Darley have
made a point of arguing that we cannot modify certain widelyshared lay intuitions without engaging in coercive practices
that are inconsistent with modern liberal democracies.76 They
might reasonably be asked whether we are permitted to hide
the mechanisms of empirical desert or whether doing so
involves an inappropriate form of exploitation or secrecy.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that we can use widely-shared moral
intuitions to generate predictions about human behavior that
help achieve public policy goals. When doing so, however, the
intuitions play no direct role in justifying the policies. When
empirical desert advocates work within this predictive mode,
they may effectively support consequentialist goals that they
have already settled on for other reasons.

74
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physicians from using placebo treatments deceptively); cf. Michael M. Grynbaum, The
Secret New York Minute: Trains Late by Design, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2009 (stating
that, according to a policy generally kept secret, trains depart New York City one
minute later than their publicly-posted departure times to give riders more time to
board); Authorities: ‘Balloon Boy’ Incident Was A Hoax, CNN.COM, Oct. 18, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/10/18/colorado.balloon.investigation/index.html
(describing how law enforcement officials lied to the media in order to give crime
suspects the false impression that the police still believed their story).
76
See Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 11, 55-56.
75

2009]

HOW TO IMPROVE EMPIRICAL DESERT

461

Despite suggestions to the contrary, empirical desert
advocates do not attend to intuitions of justice in any grand
sense. They seek only to capture a subset of our justice-related
intuitions that are somewhat abstract and taken during calm
social science surveys rather than our more heated, spur-ofthe-moment punishment intuitions. Empirical desert advocates
should make clear that there are consequentialist reasons for
limiting the inquiry into intuitions in this way, otherwise they
risk slipping into the justificatory mode.
Even when safely ensconced in the predictive mode,
empirical desert advocates should recognize that the very acts
of formulating and promulgating policies have ethical
implications. If the goals of those policies are more effectively
achieved by hiding the underlying policies, then empirical
desert advocates ought to respond to concerns that their
approach may sometimes recommend violating publicity
requirements. As a whole, consequentialists are unlikely to be
troubled by violations of the publicity condition. To the extent
that empirical desert tries to appeal to theorists of all
persuasions, however, quite a bit may turn on whether or not
empirical desert violates the condition.
The aims of empirical desert are vitally important to
consequentialist punishment. Lots of policies that may at first
seem justified by consequentialism are likely not to be when we
consider how those policies may be at odds with widely-shared
views of what is fair and just. Any real-world consequentialist
must take such second-order effects into account. Empirical
desert is an important attempt to do so, and one that can do so
even better by distinguishing more clearly between the
predictive and justificatory uses of widely-shared moral
intuitions, by gathering more empirical data about the effects
on compliance of deviating from intuitions, and by responding
to concerns about exploitation and the publicity condition.

